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Abstract
We introduce a general approach for the analysis of a quantum direct communication
protocol. The method is based on the investigation of the superoperator acting on a joint
system of the communicating parties and the eavesdropper. The introduced method is more
versatile than the approaches used so far as it permits to incorporate different noise models
in a unified way. Moreover, it make use of a well grounded theory of quantum discrimination
for the purpose of estimating the eavesdropper’s information gain.
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1 Introduction
One of the main objectives of quantum information theory [10] is to develop new protocols
for controlling the networks of quantum processing units connected by quantum channels [7].
This type of networks requires new methods allowing full utilization of the capabilities offered
by quantum information processing [12]. Quantum internetworking protocols should be able to
exploit the quantum effects, including quantum teleportation, dense coding and quantum direct
communication. However, in order to provide efficient methods for the utilization of quantum
effects in large scale networks, it is necessary to analyze the robustness of quantum information
processing against the errors that occur during the transmission [8] and processing of quantum
information [5].
In this paper we focus on the analysis of the security of quantum ping-pong protocol in
the presence of a general form of quantum noise. The ping-pong protocol [2] has attracted a
lot of attention as, contrary to quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes, it does not require
prior key agreement for confidentiality provision and it is provably asymptotically secure in
lossless channels. The theoretical success of the protocol has been closely followed by the
experimental implementation and the proof of concept installation has been realized in the
laboratory [11]. It has also been shown that the protocol variant based on higher dimensional
systems and exploiting dense information coding also share features of the seminal version when
some improvements are introduced [13, 16].
The ping-pong protocol, similarly to other quantum direct communication (QDC) protocols,
operates in two modes: a message mode is designed for information transfer and a control mode
is used for an eavesdropping detection. Although the ping-pong protocol is asymptotically
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secure in perfect quantum channels, the situation looks worse in noisy environments when
legitimate users tolerate some level of transmission errors and/or losses. If that level is too high
compared to the quality of the channel then an eavesdropper can peek some fraction of signal
particles hiding himself behind accepted quantum bit error rate (QBER) threshold [14, 17].
Thus the possibility to intercept some part of the message without being detected renders the
protocol insecurity. To cope with this problem an additional purely classical layer has been
proposed [15]. However the estimation of security improvement offered by that layer heavily
depends on observed QBER and the methods of the protocol analysis used so far do not offer
mathematical apparatus capable of QBER estimation in noisy channels. The purpose of the
presented work is to fill in this gap.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a general description of the
ping-pong protocol in the language of density operators. In Section 3 we describe a general
model of noise which can be used to describe the errors occurring during the execution of the
protocol. In Section 4 we apply the introduced description for the purpose of the security in
the passive eavesdropping scenario. Finally, in Section 5 we summarize the presented work and
provide concluding remarks.
2 General description of the ping-pong protocol
Let us consider the seminal version of the ping-pong protocol [2] in which the message and
control modes are executed only in computational basis. The communication process is started
by Bob, the recipient of information, who prepares an EPR pair
|φ+〉 = (|0B〉|0A〉+ |1B〉|1A〉) /
√
2 . (1)
At the same time eavesdropping Eve controls her own system, which is initially described by
state |χE〉. As the states of Bob and Eve are separated, the density matrix of the whole system
reads
ρ
(0)
BAE = ρ
(0)
BA ⊗ ρ(0)E = |φ+〉〈φ+| ⊗ |χE〉〈χE | . (2)
Next Bob sends a signal qubit A to Alice. This qubit on its way can be influenced by two
factors: quantum noise because of channel imperfection and malicious activities of Eve who
may entangle it with the system controlled by herself.
Let us assume that Eve is positioned close to Alice, so her action takes place on the qubit
modified by the noise. The density matrix of the system just before signal qubit enters the
environment controlled by Alice reads
ρ
(1)
BAE = (NBA ⊗ IE)
(
ρ
(0)
BA ⊗ ρ(0)E
)
= ρ
(1)
BA ⊗ ρ(0)E , (3)
where it has been explicitly highlighted that noise operator N acts only on the EPR pair (I
denotes identity operation). Before signal qubit enters Alice’s environment, Eve can entangle
it with her own system
ρ
(2)
BAE = (IB ⊗ EAE) ρ(1)BAE , (4)
where entangling operator EAE acts only on qubit A of the EPR pair and system possessed
by Eve. At that point of protocol execution Alice can select a control mode which serves for
eavesdropping detection or continue in the information mode.
In the former case she measures the received qubit in computational basis, i.e. performs von
Neumann measurement using projectors Mx,A = IB ⊗ |xA〉〈xA| ⊗ IE , x = 0, 1. The probability
that she finds qubit under investigation in state |x〉 (measures ±1) is given by
pA (x) = Tr
(
ρ
(2)
BAEMx,A
)
(5)
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After the measurement the state of the whole system is described by
σx
(2)
BAE =
Mx,Aρ
(2)
BAEMx,A
Tr
(
ρ
(2)
BAEMx,A
) . (6)
Subsequently Bob measures his qubit in computational basis using projectors My,B = |yB〉〈yB|⊗
IA ⊗IE , y = 0, 1. The probability that Bob finds his qubit in state |y〉 provided that Alice has
found his qubit in state |x〉 is given by
pB|A (y|x) = Tr
(
σx
(2)
BAEMy,B
)
. (7)
From the above, it follows that errors in control mode appear with probability
PEC = pB|A (1|0) pA (0) + pB|A (0|1) pA (1) . (8)
In information mode, Alice encodes a classic bit µ applying (µ = 1) or not (µ = 0) operator
ZA to the possessed qubit. The system state after encoding is given by
ρµ
(3)
BAE =
(IB ⊗ ZµA ⊗ IE) ρ(2)BAE (IB ⊗ (ZµA)† ⊗ IE) . (9)
The qubit A is sent back to Bob after the encoding operation. Eve’s task is to discriminate
between states ρµ
(3)
AE = TrB
(
ρµ
(3)
BAE
)
with maximal confidence. The system states after Bob’s
reception of qubit A traveling back from Alice and in the absence of Eve measurements are
given by
ρµ
(4)
BAE = (NBA ⊗ IE) ρµ(3)BAE , (10)
so Bob has to distinguish the states
ρµ
(4)
BA = TrE
(
ρµ
(4)
BAE
)
. (11)
When Eve performs measurements, the same quantum discrimination strategy is used but
Bob is unconscious that measured states are of the form
τµ,α
(4)
BA = TrE
(NBA ⊗ IE) Mα,Eρµ(3)BAEMα,E
Tr
(
ρµ
(3)
BAEMα,E
)
 . (12)
The analysis of the protocol should determine Eve’s information gain IE and the probability
of erroneous Bob’s decoding QBER as functions of probability of error observed in control
mode PEC and, optionally, parameters describing noise operator N .
3 Model of the noise
Any interaction with the environment observed from the perspective of the principal system
can be given as operator sum (Kraus) representation [10, 3]
ρ→ ρ′ = Nρ =
∑
k
KkρK
†
k (13)
provided that
∑
kKkK
†
k = I. Such an approach hides the details of the interaction of the system
under investigation with the environment, but these details are not of immediate relevance
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in analysis of many quantum information processing related tasks. In such situations Kraus
representation proved to be useful because it provides a unified description of many, seemingly
different, physical processes.
It follows from the description of the protocol operation that the signal qubit only interacts
with the environment. If that qubit was separated from the home qubit possessed by Bob,
the noise operator would be simply decomposed as NBA = IB ⊗ NA, where NA describes the
interaction of the signal qubit with the environment. However, the signal and home qubits are
maximally entangled in the ping-pong protocol and such decomposition is not obvious. In this
section we introduce a general procedure for deriving Kraus operator for such a situation and
exemplify it with the depolarizing channel.
The action of the quantum channel (13) can be represented as a supermatrix MN [9, Eq. (5)]
Res
(
ρ′
)
=
∑
k
Res
(
KkρKk
†
)
=
∑
k
K?k ⊗Kk Res (ρ) = MN Res (ρ) , (14)
where Res (·) denotes reshape transformation which maps a density matrix into a column vector
row wise. The Kraus operators can be recovered from MN with singular matrix decomposition
of the matrix DN which is related to MN via
MN =
∑
k,l
{DN }k,l k ⊗ l, (15)
where k denotes k-th element of the canonical base of ρ space [9]. When two quantum channels
NB and NA are applied to the parts of the composite system the supermatrix of the composite
channel can be found as
MNB⊗NA = MR(NB ⊗NA)MR, (16)
where MR is the matrix representing the change of base in the product space and it is commonly
called the reshuffle matrix [9, 1]. In the considered case NB ≡ IB and our task is to derive
Kraus operators for MIB⊗NA and subsequently a map for density operators analogous to (13).
The single qubit depolarizing channel with reliability r, which is commonly used to model
white noise, is described by the map [10]
N (D)A (ρA) = rρA +
1− r
4
3∑
k=0
σkρAσk
†, (17)
where σk are Pauli matrices. The supermatrix of this map is given as
M
(D)
NA =
( 1+r
2
0 0 1−r
2
0 r 0 0
0 0 r 0
1−r
2
0 0 1+r
2
)
. (18)
Using the formula (16), one gets the explicit form of the supermatrix for the extended channel
M
(D)
IB⊗NA =

1+r
2
0 0 0 0 1−r
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 r 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1+r
2
0 0 0 0 1−r
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 r 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 r 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1−r
2
0 0 0 0 1+r
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 r 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1−r
2
0 0 0 0 1+r
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1+r
2
0 0 0 0 1−r
2
0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 r 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1+r
2
0 0 0 0 1−r
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 r 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 r 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1−r
2
0 0 0 0 1+r
2
0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 r 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1−r
2
0 0 0 0 1+r
2

. (19)
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Kraus operators for the above extended channel can be obtained using eigendecomposition of
the dynamical matrix (15) corresponding to the supermatrix M
(D)
IB⊗NA :
K
(D)
IB⊗NA =
{
−
√
1− r
2
IB ⊗ σz,
√
1− r√
2
IB ⊗ [ 0 10 0 ] ,
√
1− r√
2
IB ⊗ [ 0 01 0 ] ,
√
1 + 3r
2
IB ⊗ IA
}
. (20)
Kraus representation (20) implies that the action of the extended channel on the second sub-
system is independent from the action on the first subsystem. Using the representation of the
composite system density matrix
ρBA =
[ ρ0B0A,0B0A ρ0B0A,0B1A ρ0B0A,1B0A ρ0B0A,1B1A
ρ0B1A,0B0A ρ0B1A,0B1A ρ0B1A,1B0A ρ0B1A,1B1A
ρ1B0A,0B0A ρ1B0A,0B1A ρ1B0A,1B0A ρ1B0A,1B1A
ρ1B1A,0B0A ρ1B1A,0B1A ρ1B1A,1B0A ρ1B1A,1B1A
]
=
=
∑
m,n={0,1}
[TrA ρBA]mn |mB〉〈nB| ⊗
(
1
[TrA ρBA]mn
[
ρmB0A,nB0A ρmB0A,nB1A
ρmB1A,nB0A ρmB1A,nB1A
])
(21)
one can show that it implies the following map
NBAρBA = (IB ⊗NA) ρBA = rρBA + 1− r
2
TrA(ρBA)⊗ IA. (22)
4 Passive eavesdropping in a noisy channel
As the application of the introduced description, we consider a simple model of quantum noise
described by the depolarizing channel. Let us consider the situation in which Eve does not
entangle with a signal qubit i.e. EAE = IAE . Such assumption results in the separation of
the system controlled by Eve, so it is not taken into account in further expressions. From the
map (22) it follows that the system state after the reception of the signal qubit by Alice reads
ρ
(2)
BA =
r
2
[|0B0A〉〈1B1A|+ |1B1A〉〈0B0A|] +
+
1− r
4
[|1B0A〉〈1B0A|+ |0B1A〉〈0B1A|] +
+
1 + r
4
[|0B0A〉〈0B0A|+ |1B1A〉〈1B1A|] . (23)
It follows from (8) that the probability of error occurrence in control mode is equal to
PEC = (1− r)/2. (24)
In the information mode the encoding operation leads to states
ρµ
(3)
BA = (−1)µ
r
2
[|0B0A〉〈1B1A|+ |1B1A〉〈0B0A|] +
+
1− r
4
[|1B0A〉〈1B0A|+ |0B1A〉〈0B1A|] +
+
1 + r
4
[|0B0A〉〈0B0A|+ |1B1A〉〈1B1A|] . (25)
However, Eve’s observation capabilities are limited only to travelling qubit A, thus she has to
distinguish between states ρµ
(3)
A = TrB
(
ρµ
(3)
BA
)
. But ρ0
(3)
A = ρ1
(3)
A and, in consequence, IE = 0.
Thus the noise gives no additional advantage to passively eavesdropping Eve.
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Figure 1: Probabilities of a particle loss (QLOSS) or an erroneous decoding (QBER) as a func-
tion of control mode failure probability (PEC) in protocol operation over depolarizing channel.
The qubit A in its way back to Bob again interacts with the environment so he receives the
states
ρµ
(4)
BA = rρµ
(3)
BA +
1− r
2
TrA
(
ρµ
(3)
BA
)
⊗ IA =
= (−1)µ r
2
2
[|0B0A〉〈1B1A|+ |1B1A〉〈0B0A|] +
+
1− r2
4
[|1B0A〉〈1B0A|+ |0B1A〉〈0B1A|] +
+
1 + r2
4
[|0B0A〉〈0B0A|+ |1B1A〉〈1B1A|] . (26)
If Bob uses unambiguous discrimination, the bits are lost (measurement fails) with a prob-
ability [6]
QLOSS = 1− Pmaxs = F
(
ρ0
(4)
BA, ρ1
(4)
BA
)
, (27)
where the overlap of ρµ
(4)
BA is given by
F
(
ρ0
(4)
BA, ρ1
(4)
BA
)
=
1
2
(1− r2) + 1
2
√
(1− r2) (1 + 3r2). (28)
On the other hand, if Bob uses minimum error discrimination the observed bit error rate is
equal to [4]
QBER =
1
2
(
1− 1
2
Tr
(∣∣∣ρ0(4)BA − ρ1(4)BA∣∣∣)) = (1− r2)/2. (29)
Quantities QBER and QLOSS as a function of control mode failure probability (8), which is
a parameter directly accessible to communicating parties, are shown in Figure 1. Both QBER
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and QLOSS do not scale linearly with PEC . Moreover, the functional form of the obtained
scaling heavily depends on the parameters of the noise model used, thus the correct modeling
of noise is of prime importance in the estimation of the protocol operation over non-perfect
quantum channels.
5 Concluding remarks
The usefulness of the general method based on density operator analysis for ping-pong protocol
operation has been presented. As the proof of concept the example of its application to the
analysis of the protocol execution over depolarizing channel has been given. The analysis
of a more complicated case of an active eavesdropping is left for future research. Although
the method is more cumbersome than the approach used so far, it is more versatile as it permits
an incorporation of different models of noise in a unified way and makes use of a well grounded
theory of quantum discrimination in estimation of eavesdropper’s information gain.
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